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THE TEMPORALITY OF LAW IN TRADITIONAL CHINA AND ITS
CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS
Tao Wang*
Abstract
Temporality of law is of great significance in traditional Chinese juridicopolitical thought, and its influence plays a crucial role in China's state building
and governance. The existing temporal phrases from the West are not sufficient
for explaining the symbol-oriented legal system in traditional China. Formalist
law overlooks the temporal elements intrinsic to the legal system and results in
the failure of governance. This Article applies a historical culture paradigm to
analyze the temporality of law in traditional China by using plurality, sociality,
and rhetoric as indicators to demonstrate the contestation of temporal categories
in penality, socialization of seasonal time, and the transcending moral discourse
in law, as well as by examining the temporal relevance in the classical textual
and cultural context of traditional China. The Article further shows that the intertemporal dynamism in law facilitated the formation of a unified and stable system of order over China's long imperial period. The intertemporality in traditional Chinese law still exerts huge influence on legal governance in
contemporary China.
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Introduction

Temporality is an indispensable part of law. When one seeks to analyze law in
a comprehensive manner, one fonds that temporality permeates the popular understanding of law.' However, temporality of law, or law as temporality, is not a
topic that has attracted much academic attention from legal commentators. Legal
studies often assume, and examine the conception of time, as if time were a natural phenomenon, unfolding itself as the background for socio-legal interaction. 2
Historians do not often start their investigations by targeting and defining time.
While certain legal historians have demonstrated that law unfolds in time, few
have examined how law connects with specific ideas of time. Although legal sociologists often claim that legal professionals are engaged in legal analysis
through doctrinal terms, few discuss legal temporality through symbolic concepts.
In her examination of the history of the Indian settlers in early twentiethcentury South Africa, author Renisa Mawani demonstrates law's claims to authority, legitimacy, and universality in a colonial context, conceptualizing law as
temporality through a dynamic view of past, present and future. 3 Khan offers a
systematic analytical model to explore law's temporality in society by distilling
its four general principles of correlation, inertia, triggers, and cooperation, all of
which build on the precision of temporal symbols.4
The limited literature on the temporality of law often follows Greenhouse's
perception of time as linear and cyclical to display the construction and repro-

Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the CulturalLegitimation of Law, 98 YALE
L.J. 1631, 1631 (1989).
2 Mary L. Dudziac, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2010)
(arguing that time is important but not much problematized and theorized, regarding both the research on
wartime in legal thought, as well as the broader scope of legal literature).
3 See Renisa Mawani, Law as Temporality: Colonial Politicsand Indian Settlers, 4 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 65, 93 (2014).
4 See Liaquat Ali Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 55 (2009).
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5
duction over time of normative orders and their social significance. Nevertheless, when it comes to the scenario of traditional China, mere conceptions of
time's linearity and cyclicality are not sufficient to explain the way that Chinese
law unfolds itself in history.

Moreover, while Legal Orientalism still haunts the research on Chinese law to
a certain extent, 6 temporality of law in traditional China seems to be an integral
7
part of an oxymoron that is also unworthy of serious consideration. According
to Hegel, Oriental States "belong to mere space," while the West exists in the
9
"form of time." 8 In Marx's eyes, China "vegetates in the teeth of time." Meanwhile, Foucault holds:
[T]he Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most rigidly ordered,
the one most deaf to temporal events, most attached to the pure delineation of

space; we think of it as a civilization of dikes and dams beneath the eternal
face of the sky; we see it, spread and frozen, over the entire surface of a continent surrounded by walls. 10
Foucault's description echoes what Parker opined in 1879: "[w]ith the Chinese law, as with the Chinese language, we are carried back to a position whence
we can survey, so to speak, a living past, and converse with fossil men.""
Very few commentators have attempted to investigate the temporal dimension
of law in traditional China. In his article Sociology of Time, Young first observes
that, although the linear and cyclical conceptions of time were both original to
Western culture, the linear conception of time and history prevailed when
Church and State united under the Emperor Constantine; second, the concept of
time in traditional China is cyclical because of the strong agricultural aspect of
the society.' 2 However, Young's exploration into law's temporality stops at the
point where he claims that the Chinese looked backward to the ideal state which
Confucius spoke about, in which the best and most just, harmonious relationship

See Greenhouse, supranote 1, at 1634-38.
6 See generally Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 179 (2002), and TEEMU
I

RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHNA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MODERN LAW (2013), for a close

examination of legal Orientalism; cf Donald Clarke, Anti Anti-Orientalism, Or Is Chinese Law Different?, 68 AM. J. COMP. L. 55 (2020).
? See Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, Or Is Chinese Law an Oxymoron, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 655, 655, 660 (2003), for a critique of the western view of Chinese law as a normative order
short of "real" law.
8

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 105-06 (J.

Sibree trans., 1956).
9
'0

KARL MARX ON COLONIALISM AND MODERNIZATION 323 (Shlomo Avineri ed.,
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS xix (1994).

1968).

Edward Harper Parker, Comparative Chinese Family Law, 8 CHINA REV. 67, 69 (1879).
See Peter Young, The Sociology of Time: Historiesand Historiansin the Cultures of the West
and of China, 9 LEONARDO 205 (1976).
"

12
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prevailed at all levels of society. 3 He could hardly offer a deep analysis on temporality of law in traditional China within a short article of four pages.
It is crucial that this subject be explored with renewed urgency. The goal of
this Article is to show that the temporality of law is of immense significance in
juridico-political thought in traditional China, and its influence plays a crucial
role in China's state-building and governance.
Mere onto-epistemological interpretation of temporal dynamism does not suffice for explaining the symbol-oriented legal system in traditional China even
with the existing temporal phrases from the West in hand. In his temporal research on English medical law, Professor John Harrington has offered a threefold model that takes plurality, sociality, and rhetoric as indicators in explaining
the intertemporal struggles within the legal system. 4 Albeit employed in the specific context of English medical law, Harrington's model can be drawn upon to
construct a new historical culture paradigm to analyze the temporality of law in
traditional China. On the one hand, this new paradigm makes use of the three indicators of plurality, sociality, and rhetoric to reflect the importance of temporal
dynamism in traditional Chinese law. On the other hand, it examines the intertemporality in the classical textual context and against a concrete cultural backdrop of traditional China. This Article attempts to utilize the historical culture
paradigm to facilitate the understanding of Chinese law. Such understanding is
not only of philosophical interest but is of practical importance as well. In his Interpretationof Cultures, Geertz observes:
[I]f you want to understand what a science is, you should look in the first
instance, not at its theories or its findings, and certainly not at what its apologists say about it; you should look at what the practitioners of it do. 5
It is in the examination of the actual operation
with a historical and cultural consciousness, that we
rality has been guiding intelligent human action.
though ideational, does not exist in someone's head;
occult entity.' 6

of law in traditional China,
can discover how its tempoCulture, as Geertz puts it,
though unphysical, is not an

In addition, this Article demonstrates that the intertemporality of law in traditional China facilitated the establishment of a unified and stable system of law
which anchors decision making about present actions, and projections in respect
of future actions, in past decisions and actions of common people and officials.
The intertemporality in traditional law still exerts a huge influence on contemporary China through its temporally extended legislative dynamics.

13 See Peter Young, The Sociology of Time: History and Historians in the Cultures of the West
and of China, 9 LEONARDO 207 (1976).
14
See John Harrington, Time as a Dimension ofMedical Law, 20 MED. L. REv. 491 (2012).
15

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (2000).

16 Id. at 10.
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Part II of the Article discusses the threefold analytical model put forward by
Harrington on the temporality of law. It demonstrates that the temporal mode of
a formalist law renders the legal system static, punctual, and detached from the
social environment. Part III explores the temporal dynamism in traditional Chinese legal thoughts with textual decoding and historical interpretation. Part IV
employs the historical culture paradigm to establish the understanding of law's
temporality in traditional China in its culturally concretized context. Part V considers the influence of the traditional legal temporality over the law of contemporary China, using the 2018 Constitutional Amendment, the Chinese Civil
Code, and the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National
Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as symptoms. After
Part V, a conclusion follows.
II. The Sociological Analysis of Time in Law
Since Sorokin and Merton published their groundbreaking article on the sociology of time, examining its qualitative and meaningful features in 1937," time
as a dimension of sociology has become an important theme attracting considerable academic enthusiasm. The temporalization of sociology should have
brought with it the temporalization of the sociology of law. However, most legal
sociologists do not include time as a crucial variable in their studies, or if they
do, they only examine the temporal dimensions of legal institutions and interaction in an ad hoc fashion to assist explanation of legal behavior. At the end of his
work Sociological Justice, Black envisions a sociological society which, he
8
claims, is a new stage of human evolution.1 Such an evolutionary process, if fully elaborated, entails taking into account the temporal dimension of law. Not only is law inevitably situated in time and inevitably affected by time's passing,
caught up in the flow of a nation's vital activity; it also profoundly affects that
nation's life, weaving temporal parts of its activity into practically meaningful
wholes. '1
A. Three Indicators of Time in Sociology of Law
In his pioneering article on temporality in the domain of English medical law,
Professor John Harrington contends that time, as a dimension of law, is under20
stood as social, plural, and rhetorical. Time is social in that it is not an ever2
present, neutral medium within which events simply take place. ' Typical tem-

See generally Pitirim A. Sorokin & Robert K. Merton, Social Time: A Methodological and
'7
FunctionalAnalysis, 42 AM. J. Socio. 615 (1937).
18 DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE 103 (1989).
19 Gerald J. Postema, Melody and Law's Mindfulness of Time, 17 RATIO JURIS 203, 205 (2004).
20 See Harrington, supra note 14, at 491-92.
21

See generally GEORGES GURVITCH, THE SPECTRUM OF SOCIAL TIME (1964).
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poral demarcations are the concepts of past, present, and future. It is plausible to
define these temporalities with physical or social points of references.
As far as physical time is concerned, people rarely refer to it except for those
demarcations such as a million years ago or a century in the future. In contrast to
physical time that might mostly be used to account for astronomical events, people make use of social time to mark temporal references to social events. Physical time-reckoning invariably marches on in quantitative, uniform, homogeneous, and one-dimensional units, while social time proceeds with qualitative,
localized, differentiated, and multi-dimensional rhythms of social activities."
Sorokin and Merton maintain:
[T]he search for social periodicities based upon the unquestioned adoption of astronomical criterions of time may have been largely unsuccessful precisely because social phenomena involve 'symbolic' rather than 'empirical'
equalities and inequalities; social processes which at present seem to lack peri-

odicities in terms of astronomical measures may be found to be quite periodic
in character in terms of social time."
Therefore, time can be conceived of being actively produced by various social
practices. For example, the expansion of the railways in the nineteenth century
led to the adoption of a uniform official time in European States. 24 People often
make use of social practices to indicate points of time. Certain phrases - like,
"shortly after the World War," "I'll meet you after the concert," "when President
Hoover came into office" - all use social, rather than astronomical frames of reference to indicate specific points in time."
Time is plural in that social practices are specific to different activities, peoples, cultures, and ideologies. Temporalities in the fields of astronomy, psychology, and economics are all differentiated, as well as in agricultural, hunting, fishing, nomadic pastoral tribes, and various peoples such as Chinese, Muslims,
Jews, and Greeks. 26
Time is rhetorical in that its production is in fact a strategic process of persuasion, i.e., that a specific time frame should govern in a specific context. 27 The
success of a given temporality is substantially due to its plausible representation,
whether visually (e.g., the clock) or verbally (e.g., the origin story of a nation). 28

22
23
24

See Sorokin & Merton, supra note 17.
Id. at 628.
THOMAS HYLLAND ERTKSEN, TYRANNY OF THE MOMENT: FAST AND SLOW TIME IN THE

INFORMATION AGE 43 (2001).
21

26

Sorokin & Merton, supra note 17, at 618.
See id. at 616-22.

27 Harrington, supra note 14, at 492.
28

Teresa Bridgeman, Time and Space, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NARRATIVE 52 (Da-

vid Herman ed., 2007).
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Time, for this reason, is both a resource and a stake in social struggles of all
kinds. 29 For instance, in modem society, time has become a commodity that can
be sold by the employee to the employer. In the process, a period of private time
transforms into public time, reflecting and reinforcing the temporal rigidity of
work schedules and the employee's right to claim control over his social acces30
sibility during his private time as a sort of possession. Rhetoric is a process of
arguing by means of reasonable reasons, either to account for results already
produced or to seek adherence to the production of results in the future."
B. Rethinking of the Formalist Law
Competing modes of temporality have been used to produce various opinions
on how the law should grow. In examining time as a product of social practices,
one is thus required to take seriously the discourse on the temporality of the law.
As Cardozo insists, "The law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow. It
must have a principle of growth." 32
Foundationalism believes in basic truths from which unequivocal answers to
33
legal problems can clearly be arrived at by rational procedures. The rise of positivism in the law and jurisprudence immunizes juridical rationality against other
methods and approaches in defining and interpreting the law, be they religion,
customs, history, or ethics. Positivism is the consciousness of knowledge-asregulation, a philosophy of order over chaos both in nature and society - order is
34
regularity, logically or empirically established through systematic knowledge.
Law, in Weber's view, is an act of will, and the agent of such will is the legal rational state.35 Bureaucratic administration fundamentally means the exercise of
36
control on the basis of knowledge, a feature that makes it specifically rational.
The conception of the unlimited will of a supreme legislator has served as the
irrefutable justification for absolute power, first of monarchs, later of democratic
assemblies; it appears self-evident only if the term law is restricted to the rules
guiding the deliberate and concerted actions of an organization.37 Positivist theo29 Mike Baynham, Narratives in Space and Time: Beyond "Backdrop" Accounts of Narrative
Orientation, 13 NARRATIVE INQUIRY 347, 351 (2003).
Eviatar Zerubavel, Private Time and Public Time: The Temporal Structure of Social Accessibil30
ity and ProfessionalCommitments, 58 SOC. FORCES 38, 46 (1979).
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND
31
POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 44 (1995).
32 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 20 (1924).
33 ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A NON-FOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF
LAW AND ADJUDICATION 10-11 (2000).

34

DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 31, at 73.

3

MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 33 (Talcott Parsons

ed., A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1997).
36 Id. at 339.
37

F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 87 (2013).
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ry views legislation as the center of the legal system. 38 Statutory law subsists in
an "eternal present," once enacted, it remains in force unchanged until repealed. 39 Therefore the bounded atemporality of each individual enactment indicates that the legal system as a whole partakes of "alternating time."40 The legal
system changes, but only by way of punctuality and apparently delineated actions, e.g., when the legislator intervenes. Otherwise, it exists in a motionless
present.
Austin holds that law is laid down by an intelligent being having power over
another intelligent being and that there can be no law without a legislative act.4
Law is to be understood as a unity, a system of norms or rules or doctrinal principles, which can be studied at any given moment in time as a static, coherent
system and a logical whole.42 The truths of law are correspondingly analytical
rather than temporal: the past of law is conceived as no more than the continuous
succession of its states of presence.4 3
Time here is represented spatially as a series of discrete containers, helping to
realize the positivist goal of sharply distinguishing law from its wider social environment." The will and energy of the state are provided by formal rational
law. Through positivistic order, society can be controlled so that it can be made
predictable and certain.
Nevertheless, in his renowned work The Common Law, Oliver Wendall
Holmes emphasizes that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." The text accompanying this well-known maxim reflects his concern
over the formal rationality of the legal system and elaborates persuasively on the
temporality of law:
[T]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy...have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it

cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book
of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been,
and what it tends to become. We must alternatively consult history and existing
theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to understand the
combination of the two into new products at every stage. The substance of the
& DAVID

SCHIFF, A SOCIOLOGY OF JURISPRUDENCE 68 (2006).

38

RICHARD NOBLES

39

PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 88 (2001).

GURVITCH, supra note 21, at 33.
41 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 88 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed.1879); 2 JOHN
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 555 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed.1879).
42 Peter Goodrich, Poor Illiterate Reason: History, Nationalism and Common Law, 1 SOC.
40

LEGAL STUD. 7,

8 (1992).

4 Id.

4
140

FITZPATRICK, supra note 39, at 93.
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law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is

then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree
to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its
past."5
On this point, Geertz warns with a similar metaphor that regarding culture as
the writing out of systematic rules (an ethnographic algorithm) runs the danger
of marrying extreme subjectivism to extreme formalism.4 6 To look at law as a
symbolic dimension of social action is not to turn away from the existential dilemmas of life for some idealized realm of de-emotionalized forms; rather, it is
to plunge into the midst of them. 47
III. Temporal Dynamism in Traditional Chinese Legal Thought
In Chinese history, there exist two major models of thought, which are central
to the classical legal discourse. The first one relates to the Confucian ideology of
social order, which stresses man's worldliness and governance in the style of the
legendary sage-kings, taking human-heartedness or ren (C-), righteousness or yi
(X), and ritual or li (L) as the core values of society; the second one relates to
the Legalist ideology of social control, which devotes much attention to the
methods for governing large areas, leaving a high concentration of power in the
person of the ruler and providing the techniques of governance with rational justification or theoretical expression.48
A. Confucianist Legal Thought and Its Temporal Element
(i15), or the Book of History, is one of the earliest text of
Shu King (-,,
It is conceived of as the one of the six liberal arts that
China.
in
historiography
as classics.49 The paragraph titled "The Counsels of
holds
School
the Confucian
Gao Yao" in the Books of Yai in Sha King reads: "If [the sovereign] sincerely
pursues the course of his virtue, the counsels [offered to him] will be intelligent,
0
and the aids [of admonition that he receives] will be harmonious."
Confucius (-T-)(551-479 B. C.) said: "He who rules by virtue is like the
polestar, which remains unmoving in its mansion while all the other stars revolve

45

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1923).

46

GEERTZ, supra note

41

Id. at 30.

48

See generally FUNG YU-LAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (Derk Bodde ed.,

15, at 11.

1997).

49 These are the Yi or Book of Changes, the Shi or Book of Odes, the Shu or Book of History, the
Li or Book of Rites, the Yue or Music (no longer preserved as a separate work), and the Chunqiu or
Spring and Autumn Annals, a chronicle history of Confucius' state of Lu extending from 722 to 479
B.C.
50 See THE SACRED BOOKS OF CHINA: THE TEXTS OF CONFUCIANISM 53 (James Legge trans.,
1879).
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respectfully around it." 5' He followed that with: "Lead them by political maneuvers, restrain them with punishments: the people will become cunning and
shameless. Lead them by virtue, restrain them with ritual: they will develop a
sense of shame and a sense of participation." 52
Confucius clearly contends that virtue plays a decisive role in political life,
and morals should become the principle of state-governing, while penalties
should be used as a last resort. Confucius said: "...When the rites and music
wither, punishments and penalties miss their target. When punishments and penalties miss their target, the people do not know where they stand."53
Lord Ji Kang ( iP+T)(?-468 B.C.) asked Confucius about government, saying: "Suppose I were to kill the bad to help the good: how about that?" To which
Confucius replied: "You are here to govern; what need is there to kill? If you desire what is good, the people will be good. The moral power of the gentleman is
wind, the moral power of the common man is grass. Under the wind, the grass
must bend."54
This reply reflects Confucius's conviction in morals and rites instead of penal
law. He even said: "I could adjudicate lawsuits as well as anyone. But I would
prefer to make lawsuits unnecessary." 55 The necessity of law, in Confucius's
opinion, could be utterly negated if morals and rites were revived.
Mencius (T-)
(c. 372-289 B.C.) was linked with Confucius through his
study under a disciple of Zi Si (+)) (c. 483-402 B.C.), who in turn was Confucius' grandson.5 Mencius had been worshiped by the School of Literati in traditional China as Ya Sheng (gam) (the Sage Minor). From a more pragmatic perspective, he regards law as a supplement to morals and righteousness:
[E]ven if you knew the way of Yao and Shun, you could not rule the
Empire equitably except through benevolent government. Now there are some

who, despite their benevolent hearts and reputations, succeed neither in benefiting the people by their benevolence nor in setting an example for posterity.
This is because they do not practice the way of the Former Kings. Hence it is

said, 'Goodness alone is not sufficient for government; the law unaided cannot
make itself effective'...When those above have no principles and those below
have no laws, when courtiers have no faith in the Way and craftsman have no

142

51

CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 6 (Simon Leys trans., 1997).

52

Id.

"
5
5

Id.at60.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 57.

56

FU7NG, supra note 48, at 68.
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faith in measures, when gentlemen offend against what is right and common
57
people risk punishment, then it is good fortune indeed if a state survives.
The third greatest figure in Confucian School is Xun Zi (M-T) (c. 313-238
B.C.). Among the Literati, Xun Zi's thought is the antithesis to that of Mencius.
The former emphasized social control rather than individual freedom, which is at
the core of latter's propositions.58 Xun Zi furthers Confucius's theory of ritual,
stressing that: "Men cannot live without li, affairs cannot be fulfilled without li,
59
and a state cannot be in peace without li." He views law as an instrument for
the ruler to govern the people: "Officials and members of the upper strata must
be controlled by rites and music, while the common people must be subdued by
the law and the rules." 60
Xun Zi contends that the good governance of a state all depends on the rule by
man instead of the rule by law:
[S]tatutes cannot be enacted and enforced automatically, precedents and
regulations cannot be created and applied spontaneously either. It should be the
able and virtuous who make and enforce the law, which would become obsolescent otherwise. The law is just the beginning of good governance, the class
of Jun Zi (the wise political rulers, landlords, and their officers) is the foundation of the law. With Jun Zi, plain law will be enough to cover all the parts of

the social life; without Jun Zi, though complicated, the law will be implemented in such a chaotic manner that it fails to cope with the changing circumstances and thus brings about ill governance. 61
The utility of law had been recognized by the Confucian School through a
gradual process with the development of times. It is plausible to say that this
recognition evolved along a dynamic conceptual line with temporal continuity,
62
from Confucius's preference to make lawsuits unnecessary, to Mencius's view
63
of law as the supplement to morals and righteousness, and further to Xun Zi's
emphasis on law's role in restraining and preventing crimes." Such a process of
acceptance of law by the Confucianists is defined as the Confucianization of

51
58

MENCIUS, MENCIUS 76-77 (D. C. Lau trans., rev. ed. 2004).
Fung, supra note 48, at 143.

59 See THE GROUP OF EXPLANATORY WORK FOR XUN ZI, PEKING UNIVERSITY, XUN ZI WITH
) 17 (1979).
NEW EXPLANATORY NOTEs (WTW560 Id. at 141.
61 Id. at 190.
62 CONFUCIUS, supra note 51, at 57.
63 MENCIUS, supra note 57, at 76-77.

64 THE GROUP OF EXPLANATORY WORK FOR XUN ZI, supra note 59, at 288-89 ("The purpose of
punishments is to restrain violence, to hate evil, and to be a warning against occurrence of violence and
evil in the future.").
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law.65 The Confucianists never totally rejected the use of law, but rather objected
to the Legalists' replacing morals with legal sanction.
According to historical records, the so-called Five Punishments (tattooing,
cutting off the nose, cutting off the leg, castration, and death penalty) were all
institutionalized by the sage-king, Yu (A), and his official, Gao Yao (:zJ),"
who were both worshiped by the Confucianists as the virtuous legends. Although
Confucius wished to make lawsuits unnecessary, he still admitted that he could
adjudicate lawsuits as well as anyone. 67
The Confucianists hold that moral influence is fundamental, and punishment
is supplementary. Since Xun Zi pointed out the inherent badness of human beings,68 the Confucianists have recognized the utility of legal punishment to warn
those ignorant of moral principles.
Until the time of Emperor Wu of Han (NA
Y) (156-87 B.C.), doctrinal arguments had ceased due to the dominant official position achieved by the Confucian School. The Erudites and other officials of the Later Han Dynasty opined
that a sage employed legal punishment for the purpose of supplementing virtue
and aiding the governance.6' The belief that punishments were supplementary to
morals became increasingly popular among Han Confucianists. During the Han
Dynasty (202 B. C.-220 A.D.), many laws formulated by the Legalists in the Qin
Dynasty (221-207 B. C.) were actually adopted and kept in operation.
With the need for governance, the Confucianists tried to introduce into the
law the principle and spirit of the li together with its concrete rules of behavior
and to enforce them by legal punishment. During Han Dynasty, explanatory
notes to the law were written by Confucian scholars such as Shusun Xuan ('/Jd
N), Guo Lingqing (-PIjlp),
Ma Rong (i_,M ), Zheng Xuan ( 3), and others,
whose commentaries, applicable in adjudications, were composed of 26,272 articles and more than 7,732,200 words. 70 Fairbank and Goldman call this LegalistConfucian amalgam "Imperial Confucianism," which is distinct from the original teachings of Confucius, Mencius, and their successors. 7 ' Such amalgamation
is not a punctual and ephemeral switch in social control but a durational normative cultivation for the nation as a whole.
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See T'UNG-TSU CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 363-80 (2011).
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Id. at 364.

67 CONFUCIUS, supra note 51, at 57.
68
69

1994).

THE GROUP OF EXPLANATORY WORK FOR XUN ZI, supra note 59, at 389-403.

See CHEN Li, THE EXPLANATORY NOTES TO BAI HU TONG (ObtifIfirE) 437 (Wu
Zeyu ed.,

70 See ZHANG JING, THE EXPLANATORY NOTES TO JIN SHU-XING FA ZHI (
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B. Legal Thought of Legalism and Its Temporal Element
In contrast to the position of the Confucianism, Legalism denies that a state
can be governed by the force of morals. Guan Zi (W-) (c. 723-645 B.C.) was a
famous politician of Qi state in Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.), who
was deemed a pioneer of Legalism. He said: "A sage king relies on the law not
72
the wits, and on the regularity not the comments." Shen Zi (M-T-) (c. 390-315
B. C.), another founder of Legalism from Qi state, said: "The ruler should make
law to govern the state rather than administer everything in person so that all
73
disputes can be adjudicated according to law."
Han Fei Zi ($r-T) (c. 280-233 B.C.) was the greatest synthesizer of the Legalist School. He was an able writer and composed a lengthy work bearing his
name in fifty-five chapters. It was Qin, the state which more than any other applied his principles and thus conquered the other states, that established the first
empire in China's history. Han Fei Zi combines shi ( ) (power or authority)
stressed by Shen Zi, Shu (t) (statecraft) stressed by Shen Buhai ($TF9) (c.
385-337 B.C.), and Fa (A!) (law or regulation) stressed by Shang Yang (jm
(c. 395-338 B.C.) in his theory. He thinks that these three together are "the im74
plements of emperors and kings," no one of which can be neglected.
Nonetheless, it is wrong to associate the thought of the Legalist School with
jurisprudence. In modern terms, what this school taught was a theory and method of organization and leadership. If one wants to organize people and be their
leader, one will find that the Legalist theory and practice are still instructive and
useful, but only if one is willing to follow totalitarian lines. 75 For the Legalists,
by faithfully applying their methods, a person of mere average intelligence could
govern, and govern well.
As regards the law, Han Fei Zi maintains that it is one of the tools that a mediocre ruler can make use of in his governance. He said: "The law is not used to
guard against those with virtues, but to help a mediocre ruler to curb robbers and
bandits."7 6 He also stresses: "If an average ruler can wield the law and statecraft,
a clumsy artisan can follow the rules and measurements, then nothing will go
wrong."7 7

Han Fei Zi holds that rule by law is better than rule by virtue:

72

See GUAN ZI, GUAN Zi (g -) 312 (Fang Xuanling & Liu Ji eds., 2015).
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[A]lthough taking the law as the foundation of state-governing is beset
with difficulties at the beginning, it will benefit the governance in the long run.
Although taking morals as the foundation of state-governing appears imbued
with momentary joyfulness at the beginning, it will inevitably encounter sufferings and hardships in the future. The sage king will weigh the pros and cons,
thus choose the restraints of law instead of the love of those with virtues. 78
Han Fei Zi sets out the definition of law as follows:
[T]he law is a system whose content is established and publicized by the
government, and whose punishment goes deep into the mind of the people.
Those who abide by the law should be rewarded, and those who violate the law
should be penalized.79
The School of Legalism had experienced its stages of birth and development
from the Spring and Autumn Period to the Warring States Period (475-221 B.C.)
and reached its acme of political recognition in the Qin Empire (221-207 B.C.).
In this process, the legal thought of the Legalist School had transformed from a
dynamic and evolutionary philosophical system into a stagnant and rigid disciplinary system. In 207 B.C., the Qin Empire, taking Legalism as its governing
ideology, finally collapsed due to its deviation from the social environment.
In the times prior to Han Fei Zi, one fmds that another pioneering figure of
the Legalist School, Shang Yang (also known as Lord Shang) holds a diachronic
view on the law. He said:
[H]ence, whenever it is possible to strengthen his state, the sage does not
emulate the past; whenever it is possible to benefit the people, he does not follow rituals...The [founders of the] Three Dynasties did not use the same rituals
but still became monarchs; the Five Hegemons did not employ the same laws

but still became hegemons. Hence, the wise [man] creates laws, whereas the
ignorant is restricted by them; the worthy revises rituals, whereas the unworthy
is bound by them. A man who is bound by rituals is inadequate to debate undertakings; a man who is restricted by laws is inadequate to discuss changes. 80
Lord Shang continued to say:
[F]ormer generations did not adopt the same teaching: So which antiquity

should one imitate? Thearchs and Monarchs did not repeat one another: so
which rituals should one conform to? Fuxi and Shennong taught but did not
punish; the Yellow Thearch, Yao, and Shun punished but did not implicate [the
criminals'] families; and Kings Wen and Wu both established laws appropriate

to the times and regulated rituals according to their undertakings. Rituals and
78
79
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laws are fixed according to the times; regulations and orders are all expedient;
weapons, armor, utensils, and equipment, all are used according to their utility.
Hence, I say: there is no single way to order the generation; to benefit the state,
one need not imitate antiquity.'
Lord Shang emphasizes that a sage ruler must investigate the history, customs
and roots of a state's affairs in order to make effective laws, which will facilitate
order; otherwise, laws will lead people astray, and undertakings will be to no
avail.82 Clearly, Lord Shang believes that law should be evolutionary; that law
should reflect a character which takes into account time, history, and social
change.
Regarding legal temporality, Shen Zi contends that the ruler should not maintain the law as a fixed and synchronic system. He said:
[G]overning a state without law entails chaos, but a state will decline if
its ruler renders law unchangeable. If the ruler cannot enforce the law impartially, he loses the legitimacy of governance. It is the business for the people to

abide by the law strictly, for the officials to defend the law with life, for the
83
sovereign to change the law according to the times.

In Han Fei Zi's opinion, the law should evolve at the same pace as the times
to keep the society in order; governance must fit in with social realities to ensure
its efficacy. He points out:
[T]he state will be in chaos if the way to govern doesn't respond to the
changes of the times; the state will decay if the penalties and prohibitions do
not adjust according to the increasing numbers of those clever tricksters. So in
the governance of a sage king, the law develops with the times, and penalties
changes with the behaviors of tricksters."
In the famous chapter titled "The Five Vermin" in Han Fei Zi, Han Fei Zi
tells a story about "a man who stayed by a stump waiting for hares to come and
dash themselves against it." It is stated as follows:
[I]n Song State, one day a farmer plowing in the field found that a blind
hare hashed itself headlong against the stump of a dead tree in his field and
died. That day, he ate his fill. From that day on, he no longer went in for farming. From morning till night, he stayed by that stump, waiting for miracles to

81
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take place again. However, he waited in vain and became a laughingstock of
the Song State. 85
Han Fei Zi uses this fable to warn the rulers in a new age not to envy the ancient times and imitate word by word the old laws as eternal rules. Rather, they
should investigate the realities of the present age and take corresponding
measures of governance. If a ruler plans to govern his contemporary people with
the ancient kings' institutions, in Han Fei Zi's view, he will be as ridiculous as
that Song farmer. Such a metaphor vividly demonstrates the significant difference between the diachronic and synchronic views about law and governance.
However, the emphasis on temporality of the Legalist School was thoroughly
eradicated by their own patron, the Qin Empire, after Han Fei Zi was persecuted
to death in prison in 233 B.C. by Li Si (EJi) (?-208 B. C.), his fellow student of
one and the same Confucian master, Xun Zi. 86 When Li Si became the Prime
Minister of the First Emperor of Qin Dynasty, he submitted a memorial to Ying
Zheng (EA-) (the Emperor's name), which said:
[O]f old, the world was scattered and in confusion...Men valued what
they had themselves privately studied, thus casting into disrepute what their
superiors had established. At present, Your Majesty has united the world, distinguished the black and white and established the highest authority. Yet there
are those who with their private teachings mutually abet each other, and discredit the institutions of laws and instructions... If such conditions are not prohibited, the imperial power will decline above, and partisanships will form below."?

Then Li Si made a most drastic suggestion: all historical records, save those
of Qin, all writings of the "hundred schools" of thought, and all other literature,
save that kept in custody of the official Erudites, or works on medicine, pharmacy, divination, agriculture, and arboriculture, should be delivered to the government, and burned. As for any individuals who might want to study, they should
follow the officials as their teachers.88
The aim of Li Si is transparent. He wanted to ensure that there should be but
one eternal world, one authoritative government, one orthodox history, one undisputed way of thought, one fixed system of laws and institutions. With the implementation of this recommendation, in which an extreme example was described by later generations as the notorious "burning of books and burying of
85 HAN FEI ZI, supra note 76, at 698.
86 Id. at preface 1-2. (Despite the fact that Han Fei Zi and Li Si used to study under the mentoring
of Xun Zi, the two didn't follow the Confucian doctrines in their political career. Rather, they both became a Legalist and are deemed as the great promoters of Legalism. However, it is still apparent that
Xun Zi's stress on law's utility has made significant influence on his two students).
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Confucian scholars alive" ( 4di), Qin Dynasty artificially negated the tem89
porality of law and severed the link between history, tradition, and law. The
evolution and development of law were hence hampered in Qin, resulting in the
final collapse of the Empire in 207 B. C. Since then, the School of Legalism has
declined. However, the spirit of Legalism continues to recur, as the theory and
examples discussed below indicate.
IV. Temporality in Chinese Jurisprudence under a Historical Culture
Paradigm
Harrington's understanding of time as plural, social, and rhetorical furnishes a
useful calibration in interpreting English medical law. However, law is local
knowledge as to place, time, class, and a variety of issues." Building on Harrington's understanding of time with the indicators of plurality, sociality, and rhetoric, this Article seeks to develop a historical culture paradigm through interpreting symbolic time-related sources from Chinese classics, and against China's
imperial background, in order to further our understanding of the temporality of
law in traditional China.
A. Temporal Plurality
Sally Engle Merry, in her well-known piece Legal Pluralism, points out that
one who engages in historical study should throw away the notion that the pasts
9
of traditional societies were unchanging when one engages in historical study.
She divides legal pluralism into categories of classic legal pluralism and the new
legal pluralism. The former is derived from the research on the intersections of
indigenous and European law in colonial and post-colonial societies, and the lat92
ter from the analysis of the law of advanced industrialized societies. Although
the traditional societies to which Merry refers therein are colonized ones, the
classic legal pluralism should also apply to traditional China as well; that is to
93
say, pluralism or "integral plurality" (using Fitzpatrick's term), exists in the
law of traditional China. Integral relations of mutual support between law and
other social forms tend toward convergence, i.e., elements of law are elements of
other social forms. In traditional China, social forms such as custom and ideology when penetrated by state law change their nature fundamentally and become
part of state law. Law is not a unitary phenomenon but constituted by a plurality
of social forms. Hence, Fitzpatrick holds that law is an unsettled product of rela-
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tions with a plurality of social forms, and that therefore law's identity is constantly and inherently subject to challenge and change. 94
Temporality as an integral part of law inevitably possesses such plurality.
Santos contends that legal life is constituted by an intersection of different legal
orders, namely, inter-legality, which is the phenomenological counterpart of legal pluralism. 95 Different customs and ideologies achieve legitimacy through law
that is structured with cross-temporal and narrative contestation under different
historical and cultural circumstances. It is plausible to say that intertemporality is
a manifestation of inter-legality. Such temporal plurality in traditional Chinese
law is not a product of legal doctrines, but a social fact of traditional China.
The scope of the Article does not allow for comparison in detail of the codes
of traditional China to consider the various temporalities therein. Nevertheless, it
is instructive to take the clan extermination and the corv6e labor 96 in Qin and
Han laws as examples for us to understand how conflicting temporalities expressed themselves in the penalties in traditional China.
Clan extermination in traditional China is a penalty that can be traced back to
King Pan Geng (AFB) of the Shang Dynasty (c. 1600-1046 B.C.). He once addressed his people as follows:
[O]h! I have now told you my unchangeable purpose; - do you perpetually respect [my] great anxiety; let us not get alienated and removed from one

another; share in my plans and thoughts, and think [only] of following me; let
every one of you set up the true rule of conduct in his heart. If there be bad and
unprincipled men, precipitously or carelessly disrespectful [to my orders], and
taking advantage of this brief season to play the part of villains or traitors, I
will cut off their noses, or utterly exterminate them. I will leave none of their
children. I will not let them perpetuate their seed in this new city.97

The Book of Rites notes as well that those who betray Heaven and Earth shall
be punished with clan extermination across five familial generations. 98
According to Cai Shuheng, wiping out the clan of a convict is the relic of a
blood feud that was commonplace in primitive societies. 99 Such penalty not only
eliminates the offender's physical existence in space, but also eradicates both his
ancestral and descendant lineage in time. This is what Pan Geng means by de-

94 See Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGooDE HALL L.J. 115, 138 (1984).
95 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map ofMisreading: Toward a Postmodern Conception of
Law, 14 J.L. & Soc'Y 279, 298 (1987).
96 Corv~e labor is a form of unpaid, forced labor, which is generally intermittent and lasts limited
periods of time.
97 CONFUCIUS, supra note 50, at 110.
98 WANG PINZHEN, DA DAT LI JI WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES (;kWLiCi2
i) 256 (Wang Wenjin ed., 1983).
99 CAI SHUHENG, THE HISTORY OF CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW (9125f1J;Ait) 152 (1983).
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claring "I will... exterminate them. I will leave none of their children. I will not
let them perpetuate their seed in this new city." Clan extermination carries more
significant temporal penality than any other punishment in traditional China.
Li Si, the aforementioned Prime Minister of Qin, ended up being executed
under the order of Hu Hai (MA) (230-207 B.C.), the Second Emperor of Qin,
with the Five Punishments, plus chopping at the waist and clan extermination in
208 B. C. Before the punishments, he turned his head and said to his son who
was about to be executed with him: "I wish we could go out of the east gate of
Shangcai City with the yellow dog on the leash, and hunt together the cunning
0
hares like we did in the old days. Is it possible anymore?"'
The early Han Dynasty inherited Qin's apparatus and institutions. Hence, clan
extermination was kept in Han law. Liu Bang (AM) (256-195 B.C.), the First
0
Emperor of the Han Dynasty, also used clan extermination to punish rebels.'
However, due to the temporal perishing effect of clan extermination, it is conceived of as the very symbol of cruelty of the Legalist Qin law, which demonstrates a sanction method that seeks to eradicate the condemned's past, present,
and future.
With the Huang-Lao rehabilitation policy being taken by later Han rulers, the
legal system evolved toward, to a certain extent, penal leniency, one consequence of which was that the temporal extermination of the prisoner appeared
less legitimate in the legal norms.

') (202-157 B.C.), the fourth son of Liu Bang, in
Emperor Wen of Han (W0 2
the second year of his reign issued a decree repealing clan extermination. Even
if the offender committed open rebellion, only he himself was put to death
3
Therefore, Qin law's temporal
without implicating his family or clan.'
punitiveness was diminished by a legal system that removed corporal extinction
on the lineal dimension from its sanction spectrum. However, in order to guard
against threats to their throne, the imperial monarchs chose to resurrect clan
extermination from time to time to eliminate political rivals and rebels, so that
clan extermination can be found in the imperial codes such as Wei Code
Tang Code
Kaihuang Code (}i),
), the Northern Qi Code (
(
Ming Code (ffl ), and Qing Code (Y,).1 0
()'),
The abolishment and resurrection of clan extermination in law imply that the
intertemporality of penality in traditional China unfolds with the change of ruling strategies. It switched from the utter atemporality in lineage destruction to
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the preservation of the convict's lineal temporality in the relative mercy of execution without implication, and vice versa at different historical stages.
Another instance to showcase temporal plurality in law of traditional China is
compulsory servitude. The Legalist Qin law prescribes that any adult male who
doesn't follow the timetable to report his arrival at the location of corv6e labor or
border garrison should be beheaded.1 05 The first nationwide peasant uprising in
China's history, the Uprising of Daze Town in 209 B. C, which is also known as

the Uprising of Chen Sheng (W) (?-208 B.C.) and Wu Guang (SRZ-) (?-208
B.C.), can be conceived as resulting directly from such temporal norms in Qin
law. 06

According to Sima Qian (]-_ii) (145 or 135-? B.C.), Chen Sheng and Wu
Guang were forced to lead a team of some 900 laborers to garrison a borderline
spot. In the middle of their long travel to the destination, the troop was blocked
by heavy rain, which would defintely make them late for commencement of
their labor service. In accordance with Qin law, they all would be beheaded.107
As a result, they desperately rose in revolt against Qin Dynasty, leading to the
eventual collapse of the Empire.
It is apparent in this scenario that the state law and people's everyday life
were marked by diverse temporalities. Regardless of any reasonable excuses, the
Legalist Qin law prescribes a cruel and fierce penalty for those who miss the
corv6e timetable. In reality, however, those peasants in 209 B.C. were unable to
do anything to carry on their scheduled march in the face of torrential rain. In
other words, the death penalty without exceptions is against human nature, or
law of nature. The Qin law's temporal norms conflicted with the actual temporality of everyday life of the people in that time.108 Contradictory temporalities
are not uncommon in many societies. A similar example was demonstrated by
Henrike Rau in her account of the work practices of former East and West Germans in a reunified Germany. Rau shows that East German workers (coerced into the temporal strictures of the West) provoked criticism from the state regard-

105 See SIMA QIAN, supra note 87, at 769.
106
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Although scholars don't find such harsh stipulations in the bamboo slips excavated in 1975
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ing their slow pace of working and the length of time they take for breaks, prac109
tices to which an East German worker had been accustomed.
Neither was the Taoist tendency in the earlier law of Han Dynasty congruent
with the severe legalist temporality, nor was the Confucianized law since the rule
of Emperor Wu. As a lenient ruler, apart from abolishing the four corporal
punishments save the death penalty, Emperor Wen in light of the temporal
penality of Qin law particularly reformed the system of servitude. Common
people's compulsory labor was relieved, and offenders' penal servitude was
fixed in time. A convict's lifelong corv6e labor was replaced by a fixed-term
0
servitude, based on the nature of his crime." The transformation of the explicit
temporal norms in law reflects the fact that the society of the early part of Han
Dynasty was immersed in the Learning of Huang (the Yellow Thearch (X*))
and Lao (Lao Zi ( F)), which served to undo what the Qin government had
done, and to give the country a chance to recuperate from its long and exhausting
wars."' It is in this way that the different temporalities between Qin and the
early stage of Han unfold themselves in the law. It corroborates Foucault's view
that the penalty transforms, modifies, establishes signs, and arranges obstacles
on a temporal axis." 2
When Emperor Wu, the grandson of Emperor Wen, came to the throne, the
Confucianization of law manifested itself through the so-called "incorporation of
3
the essentials of Confucianism (i) into codes."" The law by that time had
evolved onto a temporal dimension with a mixed ideology, which Fung defined
4
as "being Confucianists in appearance but Legalists in reality."" However, such
summary only establishes a superficial narrative of the process. The effect of
combination of li and law will be examined in the subpart C infra to demonstrate
how li brought into full play the rhetoric of virtue after the socialized temporality
is discussed in the following subpart.
B. Temporal Socialization
Incorporation of li into law brought an atmosphere of equity and mollification
to the governance of Han, as opposed to the turmoil and disorder in Qin caused
by its draconian law. Suffice it to say that the legal system of Han was invigorated by the need of the people and the trend of the times.
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Before turning to the examination of temporal socialization, it is necessary for
us to recapitulate the distinction between physical time and social time. Physical
time is used to indicate astronomical movements and sequence of natural phenomena happened on earth, while social time is used to mark the process of social events and mankind's activities of production.
In fact, a temporal philosophy had been developed earlier to link natural dynamics with human affairs in China's history. The Book of Changes (the I
Ching) reads:
XVI. 1. In Y6 we see the strong [line] responded to by all the others, and
the will [of him whom it represents] being carried out; and [also] docile obedience employing movement [for its purposes]. [From these things comes] Yu

[the Condition of harmony and satisfaction].
2. In this condition we have docile obedience employing movement [for
its purposes], and therefore it is so as between heaven and earth; how much

more will it be so [among men] in 'the setting up of feudal princes and putting
the hosts in motion!'
3. Heaven and earth show that docile obedience in connection with
movement, and hence the sun and moon make no error [in time], and the four
seasons do not deviate [from their order]. The sages show such docile obedience in connection with their movements, and hence their punishments and

penalties are entirely just, and the people acknowledge it by their submission.
Great indeed are the time and significance indicated in Yu!" 5
Regarding paragraph 2, translator James Legge supposes that the analogy between natural phenomena, and human and social experiences comes into play. 1 6
However, as regards paragraph 3, Legge does not comprehend "why does the
writer introduce the subject of punishments and penalties?""' The answer can be
provided by this subpart.
Confucius also said: "To Govern a state of middle size, one must dispatch
business with dignity and good faith; be thrifty and love all men; mobilize the
people only at the right times [so as not to interfere with the seasonal tasks of agriculture].""
The term shi (WI) in Chinese originally derived from ancient astrology and
was used to indicate the seasonal calendar of a year." 9 Therefore, it is plausible
to say that the initial conception of temporality in China relates deeply to seasons
"5
116
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and nature. The philosophy of nature is treated by scholars as the School of Yin
wu xing)" theory, which Schwartz
and Yang with the "Five Elements ((vi)
2
termed as "correlative cosmology," and Needham "symbolic correlations."
It goes beyond the ambit of the Article to elaborate the School of Yin and
Yang, of which both Schwartz and Needham have offered detailed analyses in
their works. It is sufficient for my purpose to say that the Yin and Yang are conceived of as two mutually complementary principles or forces, of which Yang
represents masculinity, light, warmth, dryness, hardness, activity, etc., while Yin
represents femininity, darkness, cold, moisture, softness, passivity, etc. All natural phenomena result from the ceaseless interplay of these two forces. The Five
Elements theory centers on the mechanism of the unvarying uniformity which
came to be known as Mutual Conquest or Cyclical Conquest: wood overcoming
earth, metal overcoming wood, fire overcoming metal, water overcoming fire,
and earth overcoming water, at which point the cycle commences all over again.
The cyclical recurrence of the elements according to the order of their mutual
production through the seasons of the year became much more stylized since the
Han Dynasty. Such correlative thinking was the key to the socialization of time
in traditional China. In Needham's view, while the pre-Qin School of Yin and
Yang as "naturalists", had been favorable to scientific enterprise, the Han Confucians as "phenomenalists" employing the correlative cosmology were basically
2
concerned with human and sociopolitical affairs. ' Within nature, in the cycle of
elements and the cycle of the four seasons, we can have the resonances of ongoing harmony. However, human beings have the power to destroy the harmonic
system by creating dissonant resonance, that is, the disordering acts of rulers and
of humans in general.1 22 With the development of correlative cosmology, which I
would rather call "socialized cosmology," one finds the most detailed and architectonic synthesis made by the scholar-official under the Emperor Wu of Han,
Dong Zhongshu ( 1rp4r) (179-104 B.C.), what might be called "cosmological
Confucianism," in his great work Chunqiu Fan Lu ($JA').
Dong Zhongshu said:
[C]ollected together, the ethers of the universe constitute a unity; divided,
they constitute the Yin and Yang; quartered, they constitute the four seasons;
sundered, they constitute the Five Elements. These elements represent move-

ment. Their movement are not identical. Therefore, they are referred to as the

120 See BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 350, 352, 357,
360 (1985); 2 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA 232-78 (1956). For the relationship of cosmology and power in the political process of traditional China, see generally AIHE WANG,
COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN EARLY CHINA (2000).
121
NEEDHAM, supra note 120, at 247.
122

SCHWARTZ, supra note 120, at 365-66.
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Five Movers. These Five Movers constitute five officiating powers. Each in

turn gives birth to the next and is overcome by the next but one in turn.m
In Dong Zhongshu's opinion, wood, fire, metal, and water each preside over
one of the four seasons, while earth, occupying the central position, gives assistance to all of them. The alteration of growth and decay as one season passes into another results in a yearly cycle of change. This alteration, furthermore, is
caused by the operations of Yin and Yang. 24
Dong Zhongshu observes:
[W]ood produces fire, fire produces earth, earth produces metal, metal
produces water. Water represents winter, metal represents autumn, earth repre-

sents late summer i. e. the third and last month of summer, fire represents
summer, wood represents spring. Spring presides over birth; summer presides

over growth; late summer presides over rest; autumn presides over harvest;
winter presides over storage, which is the achievement of winter.

25

He further opines:
[A]il the evil are Yin, all the virtuous are Yang; Yang is virtue, Yin is pun-

ishment. Punishment is amoral but submissive to morals so that it is analogous
to adaption [to circumstances] ... Heaven takes Yin as adaption, and Yang as
principle; Yang moves southward, Yin moves northward; principle is used in

the times of prosperity, adaption is used in the times of chaos. The display of
principle and concealment of adaption indicate that Heaven prefers virtue to
punishment. Hence Yang is the virtue of Heaven, Yin is the punishment of
Heaven...The ether of Yang breeds, the ether of Yin kills.1 26

With these correlations, on the one hand, Dong Zhongshu linked natural time
with the theory of Five Elements, which itself had been socialized with the human activities and dynastic alterations by the Naturalists; 2 7 therefore, social significance was injected into the seasonal temporality for agriculture through the
theory of Five Elements. On the other hand, Dong Zhongshu deepened the socialization of cosmology by imposing disorder and order of human society on
the ethers of Yin and Yang. With the socialized cosmology underpinned by the
theories of Five Elements and Yin and Yang, Dong Zhongshu created an ideological instrument to introduce the temporality of cosmological Confucianism into
the law of Han. Before he could complete this chain, however, he needed to take

23
DONG ZHONGSHU, CHUNQIU FANLU (ttkg)
487 (Zhang Shiliang et al. eds., 2012); 2
FING YU-LAN, A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 21-22 (Derk Bodde trans., 1953).
124 FUNG, supra note 123, at 23.

See DONG, supra note 123, at 394.
See DONG, supra note 123, at 417.
127 NEEDHAM, supra note 120, at 238.
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I26
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human activities as the medium, through which seasonal temporality could transform into a legal element.
He maintains:
[S]pring is the symbol of love, summer is the symbol of happiness, au-

tumn is the symbol of harshness, and winter is the symbol of grief. Therefore,
it is the law of the four seasons to demonstrate these four attributes.. .The Yang
of spring and summer and the Yin of autumn and winter are not only reflected
in Heaven but also in human. Without the ether of spring, how can a man exercise universal fraternity and tolerance? Without the ether of autumn, how can a
man establish his authority and achieve success? Without the ether of summer,
how can a man enjoy a prosperous and restful life? Without the ether of winter,
28
how can a man mourn the dead and arrange the funeral?

Now that Dong Zhongshu had attached social behaviors to seasonal times as
symbols, he would spontaneously emphasize a legal system that does not contradict such temporal narratives. He further holds:
[T]he sage, in his governing, duplicates the movements of heaven. Thus,

with his beneficence he duplicates warmth and accords with spring, with his
conferring of rewards he duplicates heat and accords with summer, with his
punishments he duplicates coolness and accords with autumn, and with his ex-

ecutions he duplicates coldness and accords with winter. His beneficence, rewards, punishments, and executions are different in kind, but their work is
same, all being instruments whereby the king completes his virtue. Benefi-

cence, rewards, punishments, and executions match spring, summer, autumn,
and winter respectively, like the fitting together of a tally. Therefore, I say that
the king is co-equal with Heaven, meaning that Heaven in its course has its
four seasons, while the king, in his, has his four ways of government. Such are
what Heaven and man share in common.1 29
With this co-equalization, Dong Zhongshu realizes the socialization of temporality, by matching legal practice (i.e., beneficence, rewards, punishments, and
executions) with the properties of the seasons.
He prescribes:
[T]he four ways of government have their respective positions like the

four seasons have their respective time. The four ways of government cannot
interfere with one another like the four seasons cannot interfere with one another; the four ways of government cannot change their positions like the four

seasons cannot change their positions."'

28
129
130

See DONG, supra note 123, at 433-34.
Id. at 470; FUNG, supra note 48, at 198.
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Dong Zhongshu's elucidation enables the administration of justice to traverse
both the juridico-political sphere and the natural-philosophical one. He thereby
established a Confucian system taking the Heaven and Earth, four seasons, Yin
and Yang, and Five Elements as the main structures. Based on predecessors' theories of linking Five Elements (Five Virtues) with the four seasons,131 Dong
Zhongshu introduces into Confucianist governance the necessity of compliance
with seasonal temporality, which can ensure the harmony among the Five Elements and ethers of Yin and Yang.
He reminds the rulers that they must, in their governance of the state, pay attention to the discrepancy among the phases of natural time so as to implement
law correspondingly. Through the mystical co-equalization between physical and
social perceptions, he establishes the parallel between cosmology and penal law.
Henceforth the correlation of physical time and social time was explicitly formulated in the law of Han. This is the official start of the penal policy called "executions in autumn and winter" for Han and later dynasties in traditional China.
C. Temporal Transcendence of the Legal Rhetoric
Zou Yan ( Oj) (c. 305-240 B.C.), the pioneer of the School of Yin and Yang,
who first posited a vast specific system of correlative categories embracing all
phenomena both human and natural, was best known for his correlation of the
Five Elements with the cyclical patterns of history. Zou Yan himself uses another term - the "Five Virtues ((e-) wu de)." 3 2 Zou Yan said:
[E]ach of the virtues is followed by the one it cannot conquer:
The Dynasty of Shun (one of the legendary thearchs) ruled by the virtue
of Earth, the Xia Dynasty (c. 2070-1600 B.C.) ruled by the virtue of Wood, the
Shang Dynasty (c. 1600-1046 B.C.) ruled by the virtue of Metal, and the Zhou
3
Dynasty (1046-256 B.C.) ruled by the virtue of Fire.
When some new dynasty is going to arise, Heaven exhibits auspicious
signs to the people. During the rise of Huang Di (the Yellow Thearch) large

earthworms and large ants appeared. He said, 'this indicates that the element
Earth is in the ascendant, so our color must be yellow, and our affairs must be
placed under the sign of Earth.'"3 4
During the rise of Yii the Great (founder of Xia Dynasty), Heaven pro-

duced plants and trees which did not wither in autumn and winter. He said,
See LO BuwEI, LOSHI CHUNQIU (P] EEp k) (Gao You et al. eds., 2014).
32 SCHWARTZ, supra note 120, at 357 n.17. Though Schwartz chose the English word "power" to
refer to the Chinese word de (0) which directly translates to "virtue", he notes that the word is used to
refer to human spiritual and moral power.
13 NEEDHAM, supra note 120, at 238.
134 Id.
131
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'this indicates that the element Wood is in the ascendant, so our color must be
green, and our affairs must be placed under the sign of Wood.' '5
During the rise of Tang (A) (founder of Shang Dynasty), the Victorious

metal sword appeared out of the water. He said, 'this indicates that the element
Metal is in the ascendant, so our color must be white, and our affairs must be
placed under the sign of Metal.' 136
During the rise of King Wen of the Zhou (JI3TE) (founder of Zhou

Dynasty), Heaven exhibited fire, and many red birds holding documents written in red flocked to the altar of the dynasty. He said, 'this indicates that the element Fire is in the ascendant, so our color must be red, and our affairs must
be placed under the sign of Fire. Following Fire, there will come Water. Heav-

en will show when the time comes for the power of Water to dominate. Then
the color will have to be black, and affairs will have to be placed under the sign
of Water. And that dispensation will in turn come to an end, and at the appointed time, all will return once again to Earth. But when that time will be we
do not know." 7

This was why, when Qin Shi Huang-Di ( 07r)
Dynasty) came to the throne of the unified empire,
to have conquered by the virtue of Water.

(the first Emperor of Qin

Qin Dynasty was considered

Since the Han Dynasty under the rule of Emperor Wu took the suggestion of
Dong Zhongshu to establish Confucianism as the official ideology, Li or ritual
had become the basis for the persuasiveness of the Confucian temporality in Han
law. As Confucius stresses that the ruler should mobilize the people only at the
right times so as not to interfere with the seasonal tasks of agriculture,"' a society based on cosmological Confucianism should comply with the temporal frame
set up in its law.
How then did the Confucianists set up their discourse on the temporality of
law? The crux of the question lies in the method, by which the Han Confucians
adjudicated cases. It is the rhetoric of ritual (i) that facilitated a legal transcendence across the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future.
According to Sartre, temporality is an organized structure, whose three elements, past, present, and future, should be considered as the structured moments
39
of an original synthesis, that is, temporal totality.' It is accepted that the early
1
Han Code, to a large extent, inherited the laws of Qin. It seems that the first

1
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Han Emperor, Liu Bang, initially knew little about the importance of the laws
employed by the royal court of Qin. It was Han's founding ministers such as
Shusun Tong (&Th\), Xiao He (r'(J), and Zhang Cang (
who aided
Liu Bang in making Han Code by encompassing and building upon Qin Code.
The laws of Qin can be deemed still alive in the early stage of Han with their
harshness and cruelty basically unchanged. Therefore, the past Qin law subsisted
in early Han's present and remained in force toward a certain future.
It was until the rule of the Emperor Wu that the Qin's penal influence were to
be alleviated when those Confucianist officials transcended back to a more distant past, that is, the times of Zhou Dynasty. For Han law to reflect this transcendence, scholar-officials such as Dong Zhongshu had to employ the rhetoric
of li, whose role was to conserve the ancient virtue. 14
In such a process, Dong Zhongshu, the famous Confucianist scholar-official
under Emperor Wu, invokes the principles set down in the Chunqiu (#N()
(Spring and Autumn Annals) to adjudicate cases. His work, the Chunqiu Jue Ya
(*kWAM) (Judging Cases by Chunqiu), in which 232 cases were included, 2
initiated the process of "incorporation of rituals into codes." This process was
propelled by the legal argumentation and persuasion in terms of the virtue of the
Zhou past.
Due to the limited space of this Article, the virtue rhetoric will be demonstrated through one of the six Chunqiu Jue Yu cases that have been preserved: A did
not have biological offspring. He adopted as his son a boy B who he found
abandoned by the roadside. After A brought up B, one day, B was suspected of
murder. When A received the indictment of B, he harbored B. The legal question
here was what kind of crime A had committed. According to Han code, a man
should be severely punished for his hiding murderers. But Dong Zhongshu cited
a verse from the Book of Odes: "The Mulberry insect has young ones, and the
sphex carries them away" to declare that there should be no legal difference between a natural child and an adopted one. On that basis, Dong Zhongshu further
adjudicated that A should not be punished by law citing a principle established in
the Chunqiu that a father should be allowed to shelter his son.4 3
In The Analects, Confucius maintains that a farther covers up for his son, a
son covers up for his father, and there is integrity in what they do.'" Such rhetoric constitutes a communication form and a decision making strategy based on

CH'0, supra note 65, at 368.
Unfortunately, this work was lost long ago. Only six cases can be found scattered in historical
records. See CHENG SHUDE, RESEARCH ON THE LAWS OF THE NINE DYNASTIES (f$j$$) 212-13
(2010). However, Dong Zhongshu explained in his work Chunqiu FanLu the main principle of judging
cases by the Chunqiu, the Book of Changes, the Book of Odes, the Book of History, and the Book of
Rites.
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persuasion or conviction through the mobilization of the argumentative potential
45
of accepted verbal and nonverbal sequences and artifacts.1 This argumentative
potential conformed to the political needs of the Emperor Wu to establish a single unitary authority for the whole empire, which had to mobilize the Confucian
ethics as its exclusive ideology to ease the fierce social conflicts arising in the
country due to his ambitious ruling.
It is plausible to regard Chunqiu Jue Ya as the way, in which Han Dynasty
connected past, present, and future in its legal system. Since the Han Code was
still harsh and rigid, Dong Zhongshu made use of adjudication to introduce the
past's li into the present's law so as to make right the statute's rigidness and improve the state governance for the future. Henceforth the judicial practice of
Chunqiu Jue Ya was in operation until the formulation of the Code of Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.), which comprehensively absorbed the Confucian classics
into its articles. Through Chunqiu Jue Ya, Han law transcended present, past,
and future. The past at its very source is bound to a certain present and to a certain future, to both of which it belongs.146
The advantage of Chunqiu Jue Ya is its flexibility, which alleviated the rigidness and cruelty of the Han statute law. On the one hand, Chunqiu Jue Ya initiated the Confucianization of the law; on the other hand, it promoted the diversion
of traditional justice in China from harshness to harmony. Chunqiu Jue Ya corresponds to the doctrine of precedent in the common law which reflects an "enduring time," requiring lawyers to be mindful of what went before when deciding
for the future.1 47 Both the common law and Chunqiu Jue Yu depend on a system
of stare decisis: one is of the antecedent case law, the other the antecedent moral
law.
The Confucianization of law brought by Chunqiu Jue Ya started a temporal
transformation of the concept of law from Qin's synchronic Legalism to Han's
diachronic Confucianism. The connection of the past, present, and future formed
in Confucianized law was conducive for imperial China's sustained existence for
over two thousand years as an ideologically stable society, in which the Confucian ideology was coupled with the imperial political structure of a single unitary
authority. The diachronic coupling of li and law over the whole imperial period
of China defined for scholar-officials the purpose of their judicial duties, which
48
was not arbitrary punishment but moral persuasion.'
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V. Temporal Continuity in the Law of Contemporary China
The Nationalist Government (1925-1949 A.D.) established a Western-style
legal system, which was composed of the so-called Six Laws - the Constitution,
the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure,
and administrative law. The Six Laws served as subject-matter headings under
which other laws could be placed. When the war was won by the Communist
Party of China (CPC) in 1949, one of the first acts of the new government was to
abolish all the laws of the reactionary Nationalist government.' 49 Shortly thereafter, the Law of China entered an age of overall Sovietization. Regrettably, during
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, Chinese traditional
legal culture was disrupted with Confucianism being repudiated as the main tar-

get. 150
However, as Jones points out, it is true that the only overt references in the
new China to the law of the old were negative, but it is not easy to escape one's
past, particularly for Chinese, and there was much of old China hidden in the
new, whether the new leaders recognized it or not.' 5 The linking of past and future is part of the structure of human experience and intellectual human action in
law.
In 2011, the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) declared:
[B]y the end of August 2011, the Chinese legislature had enacted 240 effective laws including the current Constitution, 706 administrative regulations,

and over 8,600 local regulations. As a result, all legal branches have been set
up, covering all aspects of social relations; basic and major laws of each
branch have been made; related administrative regulations and local regulations are fairly complete; and the whole legal system is scientific and consistent. A socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics has been solidly
put into place." 2

China had accomplished a formalist rule of law system, which was imposed
on the society through a top-down approach dominated by the CPC. '"3 Under the

149
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52 The Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics, NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. OF THE
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influence of legal formalism, China has launched numerous reforms particularly
aimed at the judicial field.'
Over the past nine years, however, the whole landscape of the reforms in China has regressed to a gloomy one.1 55 It is claimed that China's "reform era" has
ended, and its legal and political future are likely no brighter than its Maoist
past.1 56 While it appears that the commitment to legality is destined to weaken
again, some scholars hold a contrarian opinion, that even if China is deepening
its dictatorship, it is nonetheless doing so through harnessing the organizational
and legitimizing capacities of law such as empowering courts against other state
and Party entities, and bringing political powers that were formerly the exclusive
possession of the Party under legal authorization and regulation.'
Such a turn toward law, in my opinion, is similar to what Xingzhong Yu
called "state legalism," which is a combination of authoritarian ideology and distorted liberal legal institutions."1 According to Postema, law as command is a
normative ordering for subjects, which purports to guide their deliberations and
59
actions by pre-empting other reasons they may have to act.1 It is the command
model that has played a dominant role in Chinese legal development since 2013.
Law as a system of commands accords with the Chinese version of legal positivism, which is a form of constructivist pragmatism. It is to remove all limitations
on the power of the legislator that would result from the assumption that he is
entitled to make law only in a sense which substantively limits the content of
what he can make into law.' 60
In a key publication released on August 26, 2021, the Publicity Department of
the CPC Central Committee claims:
[R]especting and practicing the rule of law are essential to good govern-

ance and the implementation of the Party's policies. The CPC is committed to
law-based governance and always applies law-based thinking and approaches
to consolidate its governing status, improve its approach to governance, and
strengthen its governance capability... The Party provides guidance for legislation, guarantees law enforcement, supports judicial justice, and plays an exem'54
See, e.g., Tao Wang, China'sPilot JudicialStructure Reform in Shanghai 2014-2015: Its Context, Implementation and Implications, 24 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIsP. RES. 53, 54 (2016).
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plary role in abiding by the law. It holds that respecting the Constitution is essential to law-based governance. The Party is improving its working mechanisms for exercising law-based governance to ensure effective implementation
of its policies through the law, and to modernize China's governance system
and capacity.' 61
The instrumentalist attitude toward law in post-1978 China cannot be more
prominent, in light of the fact that over a spread of a mere two years, the Constitution of the PRC was substantially amended in March 2018, the Civil Code of
the PRC originally enacted in May 2020, and the Law on Safeguarding National
Security in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) resolutely
promulgated in June 2020 under the command and dominance of the top leadership of China. 62 I have time enough only to sketch some implications for our
understanding of the temporalities of the three laws. To analyze the comprehensive impacts of the three legal documents upon the Chinese state and society
must be left to another occasion.
Commentators have demonstrated some significant temporal dynamics of the
three laws for China's legal development. Zhai concludes that:
[T]he 2018 amendment, together with the unprecedented institutional reforms it aims to archive, has altered the reforming identity of the 1982 Constitution of the PRC in its original sense, ... [and] that the reforming identity of
the 1982 Constitution lacks a normative bound, leaving only fluidity within the
1982 Constitution in both theory and practice.1 63

161 The CPC: Its Mission and Contributions, STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2021-08/26/content_77715570.htm
(Aug. 26, 2021).
162 In January 2018, the CPC Central Committee moved the 2018 amendment to the Constitution
to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. See Suggestions of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China on Amending Parts of the Constitution, COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
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COMMITTEE
(Feb.
25,
2018,
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http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201802/25/content_5268679.htm. In October 2014, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central
Committee publicized the "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law," in which the top leadership clearly commanded that the civil
law should be codified. See Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Promoting the Governance of the Country by Law, PEOPLE'S
DAILY ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1028/c1001-259261213.html.The 20th Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress adopted the
Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region in light of intermittent civil disobedience movements resulted from the relevant
legislative attempts made by the HKSAR Government since 2003. See National Security Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, NATIONAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (July 1, 2020, 7:17 AM), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc
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Clearly, this unbounded constitutional fluidity allows the Amendment to
transcend the temporality of the 1982 Constitution, enchaining past and future in
China's constitutional order.
Among the institutional arrangements in the Amendment, removal of the term
limit of the state president and the establishment of the Supervisory Commission
system ("SC system") are the most controversial.'"
The term limit of state president was enshrined in the original version of the
1982 Constitution as a remarkable result of the limited political reform led by
Deng Xiaoping after the Cultural Revolution.' 65 It is the first time in Chinese history that the reign of the top leader was placed within a temporal framework of
the law, that is, a term limit of no more than two consecutive terms (ten years).
With the term limit in the Constitution, China had established a sort of legal
convention that applies to the power structure of China's politics, realizing the
transfer of the top power on a generally accepted temporal basis. Nevertheless,
removal of the term limit in the Constitution may cause the diachronic power
dynamics in China's leadership to regress to synchronically alternating reigns for

life.
The establishment of the SC system is the embodiment of the CPC's political
supervision over the entire bureaucratic system of the state at all levels. This reform was initiated in connection with the broad anti-corruption campaign, together with the CPC's tradition of internal supervision. The substantial authority
of the SCs at all levels is defined in the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China, which was promulgated shortly after the 2018 Constitutional
Amendment, as the authority to "conduct supervision of public officials exercising public power."' 66
Merging with the CPC's Discipline Inspection Committees at all levels, the
SCs have also absorbed the anti-corruption force of the Procuratorates and have
67
become the only anti-corruption agency in China.' The 2018 Amendment has
de facto created a more powerful organ than any other, one authorized with the
68
power to check the rest in the sense of "full-coverage" supervision. A Censorate system therefore has been revived in modern China.

64
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The Censorate as an organ for surveillance over bureaucrats was originated by
the Legalist-influenced Qin Dynasty.1 69 However, despite an ambivalent posture,
Confucianism also supported such a legitimated system of universalistic, rationalistic, mild, and changeable sanctions applied to officials.'70 The establishment
of the SC system reflects a regression to the traditional disciplinary mode of
China's legal institutions. 7 ' At the present day, as Stephens observes, for practical purposes the reconciling of the Chinese and the Western systems remains as
much in the realm of wishful thinking as it was to the Mixed Court in the
1920s.172 The establishment of the SC system shows that Chinese legal development has not been able to break through the temporal cycle in an almost static
social structure, a pattern of conventions, customs, traditions, and regularities in
the application of disciplinary enforcement procedures.
As regards the first Civil code of the PRC, Jiang argues that certain rules that
embody traditional Chinese moral philosophy have been stipulated in it, and they
will surely clash with the principles of Western private law of the modern
world. "'
For example, a liability in equity regime has become a part of the China's tort
law in the Civil Code. Article 1186 of the Code provides for a liability without
fault. It states: "If the damage is through no fault of both the victim and the tortfeasor, the loss may be borne by both parties according to the law."'74 Under this
rule, the defendant who has no fault for causing a harm can be liable for a partial
loss suffered by the victim. Therefore, the defendant may be liable if he has the
financial capacity to pay and if the judge deems it appropriate.
Where a harm that is not subject to strict liability is suffered but neither party
has fault, there would be no recovery in Western tort law. However, this doctrine
is not compatible with the Confucianist principle of even distribution of losses.
Confucius said: "I have always heard that what worries the head of a state, or the
chief of a clan is not poverty but inequality.. .For if there is equality, there will
be no poverty..."175
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It is evident that the Confucianist recurrence in private law of China has not
been ceased since the reign of the former CPC Secretary General Hu Jintao, who
76
advocated populist justice and social harmony.' In the "New Era" under the
current leadership of Xi Jinping, a tendency toward promoting traditional culture
of China has become more apparent. Xi Jinping once said:
[T]he excellent traditional Chinese culture is the cultural root of the Chinese nation. The ideology, humanistic spirit, and moral norms it contains are
not only the core of our Chinese people's thinking and spirit, but also have important value in solving human problems. It is necessary to extract and display

the spiritual identity of excellent traditional culture, and extract and display the
cultural essence of excellent traditional culture with contemporary world sig-

nificance.'?7
It is plausible to observe that the once-eager pursuit of social harmony in Hu's
time has been revived in the area of private law since the second term of Xi. It
reflects what Confucius believes: when practicing the ritual, what matters most
is harmony. ?8
Through the intertemporality among the present of Xi's reign, the near past of
Hu's reign and the Confucianist reign in ancient China, the Civil Code absorbs
traditional doctrines into its regulation of legal acts in China's contemporary era.
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("the National Security Law,"
or "NSL") is a law of huge controversy. Scholarly criticism on the NSL includes
that the creation of hybrid Mainland-Hong Kong national security bodies by the
Law directly threatens the "One Country, Two Systems" framework; that the
NSL is being used to punish the exercise of basic political rights by the government's peaceful political opponents and its critics;'7 and, that Hong Kong is no
80
longer operating a truly separate legal system from Mainland China.1
From a temporal perspective on the NSL, however, the effect of its Article 46,
though not in much debate yet, is definitely worth probing. Article 46 reads:
[I]n criminal proceedings in the Court of First Instance of the High Court concerning offences endangering national security, the Secretary for Justice may
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issue a certificate directing that the case shall be tried without a jury on the
grounds of, among others, the protection of State secrets, involvement of foreign factors in the case, and the protection of personal safety of jurors and their
family members. Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the certificate, the
case shall be tried in the Court of First Instance without a jury by a panel of
three judges.
Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the certificate, the reference to 'a jury' or 'a verdict of the jury' in any provision of the laws of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region applicable to the related proceedings shall be
construed as referring to the judges or the functions of the judge as a judge of
fact.181
Article 46 of NSL is an unprecedented legislative action that removes the right to
trial by jury in criminal justice of the Supreme Court or the later High Court
since the English jury system was introduced to Hong Kong in 1845.182
The right can be traced back to the Magna Carta, which states:
[N]o freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way molested; and we will not set
forth against him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land.' 83
Although the definition of what constitutes a person's "peer" has a varied history, the jury system is deemed the foundation of the common law. The way the
right to trial by jury developed has been a major factor that has distinguished the
common law from other legal systems (including Chinese law).' 4 It is true that
in almost every sphere, from the role of the civil service to the functions of the
courts to the government's role in the economy, mainland experience and norms
bear little likeness to those in Hong Kong.1 85
What concerns me here is the potential conflict between the temporal dimension of the common law and that of Chinese law. Different temporalities of the
law lead to different perceptions and practices of the law, that cultivate discordant legal cultures. The English supposed that the common law was the only law
their land had ever known, and this by itself encouraged them to interpret the
past as if it had been governed by the law of their own day.
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The immemorial character of the common law as a customary law strengthens
the English tendency to read existing law into the remote past, of which the jury
system is one of the most important parts. The English believe that the common
law is the most advantageous law to make and preserve a commonwealth, unlike
written laws which are made by the rulers and imposed on the subjects before
any trials are made. A custom never becomes a law to bind the people, until it
has been tried and approved without the consideration of time, during which
86
time there did thereby arise no inconvenience.'
The common law was by definition immemorial custom, and the function of
the courts was to declare the ancient custom of the realm. Therefore, one found
that Lord Coke identified the law of his own day with the law of the earliest records, just as he established the doctrine that the latter contained what had been
law since before the Norman Conquest.1 87
The temporal character of the common law reminds one of what Confucianism puts forward in the contest with other schools of thought in China that the
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The jury system in Hong Kong inherited the temporality of the common law.
Hong Kong people's perception of the jury system reflects such a common-law
mind, which regards the jury trial as the fairest method for disposing of a crimi88
nal case, and as a safeguard against the arbitrary power of the state.' Removal
of the trial by jury in the High Court's criminal proceedings concerning offenses
endangering national security will result in the break of the temporal coherence
of the law in Hong Kong, which is incompatible with the punctual constructivist
actions of the legislator that always triggers the changes in legal control by way
of delineated interventions.
VI. Conclusion
The temporality of law in traditional China must be explored at the level of
the philosophical and cosmological concepts of the nature and purpose of order
in the universe. Differentiated temporal frameworks in law can be deduced from
references to traditional classics of major ancient schools of thought. It is reasonable to maintain that temporality is an important dimension for law to have a
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desirable effect in traditional China. Overlooking law's temporality will lead to
static governance that causes damage to any sovereignty. Using the historical
culture paradigm, one can broaden the approach to understanding and interpreting Chinese legal development.
In traditional China, the law is made up of a plurality of ideologies such as
Legalism, the Learning of Huang Di and Lao Zi, and Confucianism. Law's temporality is continually subject to changes. Inter-legality is manifested by intertemporality in terms of penal severity. Temporal plurality in traditional Chinese
law can be inferred from penalties such as clan extermination and compulsory
servitude.
Temporal socialization in traditional Chinese law was realized through symbolic correlations made by the Han cosmological Confucianists. Their interpretation of the pre-Qin naturalist Five Elements according to the order of successive
production through the seasons and the enchainment of the natural phenomena
with the two mutually complementary forces of Yin and Yang were used in a
phenomenalist manner so as to direct the intellectual enterprise from a scientific
one to a sociopolitical one, through which the temporality of the cosmological
Confucianism was imported into the law.
The incorporation of li into codes indicates the start of a gradual process of
Confucianization of law in China's imperial history, which itself remained in a
diachronic coupling momentum maintained by the ruling ideology and sociopolitical environment of traditional China. Through the judicial practice of Chunqiu
Jue Yu, with the rhetoric li at its core, traditional China could connect its past,
present, and future. The rhetoric of li promoted the formation of a temporal totality, that is a meaningful whole in Chinese law, which helped sustain a stable imperial sociopolitical structure of a single unitary authority.
Temporality of traditional law still holds sway in the law of contemporary
China, no matter whether the legislators recognize it or not. The enchainment of
past and future has always been a part of the dynamism of present Chinese law.
Communist China in the twenty-first century has restored a formalist and rationalist system of law, which bears an apparent resemblance to the past Legalism,
bringing political powers under legal authorization and regulation in order to
strengthen the power operation of the top leadership in the future. Removal of
the term limit of the President of the PRC in the Constitution switches the temporality of the power structure within the CPC from a durational and dynamic
one to an ephemeral and static one. The establishment of the SC system by the
constitutional amendment indicates a further regression of China's legal institutions to the traditional disciplinary mode, showcasing how Chinese legal development repeats its history within the temporal cyclicality. The newly promulgated Civil Code of the PRC provides one with a perspective to discover the
intertemporality of the private law in China, which relies heavily on the Confu-
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cian ethics back in ancient times to realize its instrumentalist purpose of estab89
lishing a stable and common prosperous society in contemporary era.1 The Secretary for Justice of HKSAR has the authority under certain circumstances to issue a certificate under NSL 46(1) to deprive the accused of their right to jury
trial in the High Court. The Court of Appeal of Hong Kong has also made it
clear that as a prosecutorial decision, it is only amenable to judicial review on
the limited grounds of dishonesty, bad faith and exceptional circumstances as
explained in the case law. '0 With the common law city becoming subjected to
the NSL framework, the immemorial diachronicity of customs is suppressed by
the synchronicity of formalist positive legislation. The situation in Hong Kong
arguably displays the painful intertemporal friction between the two sources of
law.
Temporality of law or law's continuity over time, for Hale, was thought to be
the essential character of the unwritten law, which is not set down in writing by
any legislators or rulers - the law acquires its binding power or force by a long
and immemorial usage.1 9' Hence law's continuity is accepted through not only
compliance, active consent, or endorsement by court and community, but also
incorporation of the norms into the common law and common life of the society.1 92 China has become a state established on statutory law since the Qin Dynasty. Each individual code in traditional China can be considered bounded in its
own eternal present unless a legislative change occurred. However, such atemporality of individual statutes does not mean that the whole legal system of traditional China remained thoroughly in a synchronic and static status. The incorporation of moral norms into the formalist legal system worked as one of the most
important frameworks of Chinese cultural interaction over time. This legal philosophy entailed making use of the past ethical narratives as bases for projection
of normative guidance across time. The identity, unity, and persistence of Chinese law over time was a matter of all the moral and legal norms fitting together
into a practically coherent system of order that matched and shaped the people's
life in Chinese society.
By seriously taking temporality of law into account, one can discover that although China has been a country with a formalist system of written law since the
very beginning of its imperial history, the law in China at different stages of its
legal development has reflected a meaningful diachronic dynamism, which deserves further attention from theorists of Chinese law.
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